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In his 2003 Presidential Address to the American Eco-
nomic Association, Robert Lucas stated:
Macroeconomics was born as a distinct ﬁ eld in the 
1940’s, as a part of the intellectual response to the 
Great Depression. The term then referred to the body 
of knowledge and expertise that we hoped would 
prevent the recurrence of that economic disaster. My 
thesis in this lecture is that macroeconomics in this 
original sense has succeeded: Its central problem of 
depression prevention has been solved, for all prac-
tical purposes, and has in fact been solved for many 
decades. There remain important gains in welfare from 
better ﬁ scal policies, but I argue that these are gains 
from providing people with better incentives to work 
and to save, not from better ﬁ ne-tuning of spending 
ﬂ ows. Taking U.S. performance over the past 50 years 
as a benchmark, the potential for welfare gains from 
better long-run, supply-side policies exceeds by far the 
potential from further improvements in short-run de-
mand management.1
Less than ﬁ ve years after he delivered his address, a re-
cession began in the US which morphed into the global 
ﬁ nancial crisis and into what has come to be called the 
Great Recession, affecting all Western economies to a 
greater or lesser extent.
Lucas can be forgiven for not predicting the global ﬁ -
nancial crisis. And he turned out to be right in predicting 
that the consequences of the crisis were mitigated in the 
US by the policy response, which certainly drew on the 
lessons learned from the Great Depression. In the Great 
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1 R.E. L u c a s  Jr.: Macroeconomic priorities, in: American Economic 
Review, Vol. 93, No. 1, 2003, p. 1.
Recession of 2008-2009, US GDP fell by a far smaller 
percentage than it had in the Great Depression of the 
1930s. But he was clearly wrong to state that the institu-
tions of monetary and ﬁ scal policy in place in the US in 
2003 would prevent such a crisis arising in the ﬁ rst place. 
And all the advances in macroeconomics since the 1930s 
have not prevented other countries, for example in South-
ern Europe and particularly Greece, from suffering the 
equivalent of a Great Depression.
Another view expressed in Lucas’s address has proved 
very inﬂ uential. This is that macroeconomics is mainly 
about the movements of GDP and productivity around a 
trend which is determined by other factors lying largely 
outside of macro – some of them economic in nature, 
like taxes, and others less immediately so, like techni-
cal progress. This is surprising, since there was plenty 
of evidence that ﬁ nancial crises, particularly banking cri-
ses, can damage growth. The most obvious examples 
are the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s and the 
Asian ﬁ nancial crisis of the 1990s.2 Economists studying 
these regions have often noted the disastrous effects of 
“sudden stops”, when banks that have made illiquid in-
vestments on the basis of short-term funding, often from 
abroad, have this funding cut off. A “sudden stop” is a 
good description of what happened to the banks in many 
Western countries in 2008 and 2009.
As is well known, the growth of labour productivity and 
total factor productivity (TFP) declined sharply in coun-
tries experiencing a marked reduction of GDP in the Great 
Recession. There is nothing surprising about this. It is a 
well-known effect of labour hoarding and low capital uti-
lisation, similar to what had been experienced in previous 
recessions. What is surprising is that low or even zero 
productivity growth has continued well past the time at 
which the recession proper, that is the period when GDP 
was actually falling, came to an end and into the so-called 
2 These have been subsequently studied in C.M. R e i n h a r t , K.S. R o -
g o f f : This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly, Prince-
ton 2009, Princeton University Press; C.M. R e i n h a r t , K.S. R o g o f f : 
Growth in a Time of Debt, in: American Economic Review, Vol. 100, 
No. 2, 2010, pp. 573-578; C.M. R e i n h a r t , K.S. R o g o f f : From Fi-
nancial Crash to Debt Crisis, in: American Economic Review, Vol. 101, 
No. 5, 2011, pp. 1676-1706; and C.M. R e i n h a r t , K.S. R o g o f f : Erra-
ta: “Growth in a Time of Debt”, mimeo, 5 May 2013, available at http://
www.carmenreinhart.com/user_uploads/data/36_data.pdf. See also 
e.g. N. O u l t o n , M. S e b a s t i á - B a r r i e l : Effects of Financial Crises 
on Productivity, Capital and Employment, in: Review of Income and 
Wealth, Vol. 63, February 2017, pp. S90-S112.
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The slowdown in growth since the Great Recession
Table 1 documents the slowdown in the growth of out-
put and productivity since 2007 in 23 Western countries, 
based primarily on data from EU KLEMS.6 EU KLEMS 
is preferable to other data sources on grounds of meth-
odological consistency, but it only provides data on TFP 
growth for 14 of the 23 countries. On average across 
these 23 countries, GDP growth has slowed down by 
2.66 percentage points per annum (pppa), hours worked 
by 1.18 pppa, and labour productivity (GDP per hour) by 
1.30 pppa. In the 14 countries for which TFP growth can 
be calculated, it slowed down by 0.88 pppa, while the 
growth of capital intensity slowed by 0.40 pppa. Cer-
tainly for these 14 countries, and probably for the others 
as well, the slowdown in TFP accounts for the bulk of the 
slowdown in labour productivity, in a growth accounting 
sense.
The labour productivity experiences of different countries 
are quite diverse. Though labour productivity growth fell 
on average, there were ﬁ ve exceptions: Denmark, Ireland, 
Greece, Italy and Spain. In the case of Greece, Ireland 
and Spain, this improvement in productivity was accom-
panied by a massive decline in labour input, in both em-
ployment and hours. For Italy, the improvement was tiny, 
and in any case, Italian labour productivity growth was 
roughly zero before the crisis. Meanwhile, Australia is 
an exception in the other direction. It experienced a very 
small decline in labour productivity growth alongside a 
below-average decline in GDP growth.
The picture for TFP is even worse. TFP growth has been 
on average negative from 2007 to 2015, and so the TFP 
level was lower for most countries in 2015 than it was in 
2007. The best performer is the US, but even here the TFP 
level in 2015 was only about one per cent above the 2007 
level.
Elsewhere I have argued that the varying pattern of labour 
productivity growth post-crisis reﬂ ects differences in la-
bour market institutions.7 In some countries, such as the 
UK, labour input rose quite rapidly before the crisis and 
has continued to rise since then. In others, the growth of 
labour input has been constrained post-crisis by immi-
gration policy (Canada and Australia) or by labour mar-
ket rigidities which prevent the unskilled in particular from 
competing effectively in the job market. The latter situa-
tion is the case in much of continental Europe, which has 
6 The latest release of data, from September 2017, is available at www.
euklems.net. I exclude very small countries and ones which do not 
report data for hours worked.
7 See N. O u l t o n , op. cit.
“recovery” period. An extreme example is the UK, which 
has had effectively zero growth of labour productivity in 
the ten years since 2007 – this despite a falling unem-
ployment rate (which currently stands at 4.4%) and an 
increase in the labour force and hours worked, which 
are now some nine per cent higher than at the previous 
peak.
Nonetheless, the accepted view now seems to be that 
ongoing low productivity growth has little or nothing to 
do with the recession. It is instead explained by a decline 
in the growth rate of TFP, which predated the crisis. This 
decline is partly exogenous, due to the fading effects of 
the ICT revolution, but is also partly endogenous, due to 
weaknesses in the competitive process, which again pre-
date the recession.3 This has been compounded in some 
countries by a failure to adopt the type of structural re-
forms long advocated by the OECD.
The authors cited above have offered convincing expla-
nations for why we ought to expect TFP growth to be 
lower in the future than it was in the glory days of the ICT 
revolution in the US. And there does seem to be evidence 
that the competitive process has been weakening; for ex-
ample, laggard ﬁ rms seem to have increasing difﬁ culty 
catching up to the leading ones.4 But this is not the whole 
story. I argue instead that the Great Recession did sig-
niﬁ cant damage to productivity growth through a num-
ber of channels. Consequently, raising the growth rate of 
GDP would also raise the growth rate of labour produc-
tivity and of TFP. That there has been no spontaneous 
recovery in productivity growth to pre-recession rates 
thus far, particularly in Europe, is due to the nature of the 
recession, which I argue is due to constrained demand 
for each country’s exports.5
3 A. B e rg a u d , G. C e t t e , R. L e c a t : Productivity Trends from 1890 to 
2012 in Advanced Countries, Banque de France Working Paper No. 
475, 2014; J.G. F e r n a l d : Productivity and potential output before, 
during and after the Great Recession, in: J.A. P a r k e r, M. Wo o d -
f o rd : NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2014, Vol. 29, Chicago 2014, 
University of Chicago Press, pp. 1-51; G. C e t t e , J.G. F e r n a l d , B. 
M o j o n : The pre-Great Recession slowdown in productivity, in: Euro-
pean Economic Review, Vol. 88, 2016, pp. 3-20.
4 See e.g. G. C e t t e , S. C o rd e , R. L e c a t : Firm-level productivity dis-
persion and convergence, in: Economics Letters, Vol. 166, May 2018, 
pp. 76-78.
5 This view is more fully set out in N. O u l t o n : The UK (and Western) 
productivity puzzle: does Arthur Lewis hold the key?, Centre for Mac-
roeconomics, Discussion Paper No. CFM-DP-2018-09, 2018. There 
I set out what I call the neo-Lewis model, which ﬁ nds inspiration in 
W.A. L e w i s : Economic development with unlimited supplies of la-
bour, in: The Manchester School, Vol. 22, No. 2, 1954, pp. 139-191. 
This model behaves like the Solow model in good times, but in bad 
times the growth of GDP is constrained by the growth of demand for 
exports.
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Country GDP
Employ-
ment Hours
GDP per 
hour TFP
Capital 
intensity
Austria -1.74 -0.11 -0.50 -1.24 -0.91 -0.57
Australia -1.21 . -1.19 -0.02 -0.23 +0.21
Belgium -1.28 -0.26 -0.30 -0.98 -0.57 -1.34
Bulgaria -4.17 -2.98 -3.18 -0.99 . .
Canada -1.18 . -1.00 -0.19 +0.10 -0.66
Czech 
Republic
-3.79 -0.46 0.20 -3.97 -3.87 +0.22
Germany -0.78 +0.67 0.44 -1.22 -0.95 -1.42
Denmark -0.94 -1.16 -1.01 +0.07 -0.40 +0.84
Greece -7.39 -3.72 -4.21 -3.18 . .
Spain -3.78 -5.24 -4.85 +1.07 -0.05 +1.47
Finland -3.81 -1.28 -1.24 -2.57 -2.61 +0.10
France -1.28 -0.56 -0.54 -0.74 -0.59 -1.02
Ireland -4.68 -4.27 -5.31 +0.63 . .
Italy -2.09 -1.76 -2.17 +0.09 +0.19 +0.20
Nether-
lands
-1.39 -0.89 -0.63 -0.76 . -0.02
Poland -2.26 +0.04 -0.11 -2.15 . .
Portugal -1.87 -1.32 -1.40 -0.48 . .
Romania -4.40 +0.92 0.20 -4.59 . .
Sweden -1.70 +0.04 0.30 -2.00 -0.59 -1.05
Slovenia -4.46 -1.38 -0.66 -3.80 . .
Slovakia -3.94 -0.53 -0.60 -3.35 . .
United 
Kingdom
-1.83 -0.17 0.00 -1.83 -1.30 -1.65
United
States
-1.22 -0.68 -0.15 -1.08 -0.54 -1.35
Cross-
country 
average
-2.66 -1.20 -1.18 -1.30 -0.88 -0.40
Table 1
Changes in growth rates, 2007-2015 compared to 
2000-2007, in 23 countries
in % per annum
N o t e s : Ireland: 2007-2014, not 2007-2015, since Irish GDP in 2015 was 
distorted by tax manipulation by multinationals. Poland: 2003-2007, not 
2000-2007, due to missing values in 2000, 2001 and 2002. For Canada 
and Australia, ﬁ gures are for the market sector. For all other countries, 
ﬁ gures are for the whole economy.
S o u rc e s : Data for Europe and the US are from EU KLEMS: EU KLEMS 
Growth and Productivity Accounts 2017 Release, available at www.euk-
lems.net. Data for Canada are from Statistics Canada: Multifactor pro-
ductivity, value-added, capital input and labour input in the aggregate 
business sector and major sub-sectors, CANSIM Table 383-0021, avail-
able at https://www.statcan.gc.ca/eng/start. Data for Australia are from 
Australian Bureau of Statistics: Estimates of Industry Multifactor Produc-
tivity, Table 5260.0.55.002, available at http://www.abs.gov.au/AusStats/
ABS@.nsf/MF/5260.0.55.002.
seen a large rise in unemployment and a large fall in em-
ployment.
These differences in institutions would not have mat-
tered much if the good times which prevailed before the 
crisis had continued. But since the crisis, each country 
has faced constrained demand for its exports, which 
leads to slower growth of GDP. Why? Because a lower 
growth rate of exports eventually means a lower growth 
rate of imports as well. This prevents domestic demand 
from ﬁ lling the gap left by the constrained demand for 
exports. Suppose imports are consumer goods. Then 
either the intertemporal borrowing constraint will lead 
to lower imports or, if not, lenders will refuse to extend 
unlimited credit to ﬁ nance consumption.8 This is the 
case even for countries like the US which run persis-
tent current account deﬁ cits. Now if, in this situation of 
constrained demand, the growth of labour input is held 
down, the impact on labour productivity can be mitigat-
ed, though at the cost of higher unemployment and lower 
employment. But in countries where this is not possible, 
labour productivity growth will slow down more sharply.
This mechanism could operate irrespective of what is 
happening to TFP. But because on the face of it the pro-
ductivity slowdown is a TFP slowdown, it is necessary to 
directly consider the factors lying behind the latter.
Why has TFP growth declined?
Recessions and TFP
According to standard growth theory since Solow, in 
the long run the growth of TFP drives capital accumula-
tion and the growth of labour productivity.9 In turn, the 
growth of TFP, though it may be inﬂ uenced in the short 
run by many other factors,10 is ultimately driven by innova-
tion and technical progress. The latter may be affected by 
economic institutions and incentives but not by monetary 
and ﬁ scal policy.
On the face of it, it seems highly implausible that a for-
tuitous and exogenous decline in the rate of innovation 
could account for slow productivity growth after 2007 in 
the countries studied here. The issue is not whether we 
are technology optimists like Brynjolfsson and McAfee 
8 The analysis is similar if imports are of intermediate goods used in 
production.
9 R.M. S o l o w : A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth, in: 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 70, No. 1, 1956, pp. 65-94.
10 N. O u l t o n : The mystery of TFP, in: International Productivity Monitor, 
Vol. 31, 2016, pp. 68-87.
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or technology pessimists like Gordon.11 The collapse in 
TFP growth that has occurred since 2007 in EU coun-
tries and even in the United States seems to dwarf the 
effects stemming from a lower rate of technological pro-
gress.
The alternative explanation is that the recession itself has 
somehow adversely affected TFP growth. There are in 
fact at least two channels through which this could have 
occurred. 
First, the amount of innovation taking place in the econo-
my may be temporarily reduced, due to a loss of business 
conﬁ dence.12 Innovation is implemented through or ac-
companied by investment in intangibles (e.g. R&D, in-ﬁ rm 
training or expenditure of management time on corporate 
restructuring), or it could take the form of new entrants 
into an industry bringing new products, new technology 
or new business methods. All this is (arguably) what lies 
behind TFP growth as conventionally measured, but not 
all of these are counted as investments in the current Sys-
tem of National Accounts.
Innovation is a cumulative process, and the supply of 
workers and entrepreneurs capable of innovating is 
likely to be inelastic. So unlike with physical capital, a 
reduction in innovation in one period cannot easily be 
made up in a subsequent one. In other words, less in-
novation today means that the future level of TFP is per-
manently lower. For illustration, suppose that prior to a 
crisis, assumed to last h years, the economy is capable 
of generating a stream of innovations a, b, c, ... from the 
current year t onwards. As a result of the crisis, the ﬁ rst 
innovation a is now delayed to year t+h; the subsequent 
innovations b, c, ... are now also delayed h years to years 
t+h+1, t+h+2, ... , and so on. Though all innovations are 
eventually introduced, the level of TFP will clearly be 
lower in every post-crisis year than it would have been 
in the absence of the crisis. And for h years, the growth 
rate of TFP will be below its pre-recession rate, even if 
it recovers after this period. A reduction in the TFP level 
will also lead to a secondary effect, namely a reduction 
in the desired level of capital, which also reduces labour 
productivity.
A second channel through which the recession could 
have negatively impacted TFP growth is via an externality 
associated with the expansion of output itself. This argu-
11 See E. B r y n j o l f f s o n , A. M c A f e e : The Second Machine Age, New 
York 2014, Norton; and R.J. G o rd o n : The Rise and Fall of American 
Growth, Princeton 2016, Princeton University Press.
12 N. O u l t o n , M. S e b a s t i á - B a r r i e l , op. cit.
ment goes back to Hall.13 Following his work, Bartelsman 
et al. found support for increasing returns on US data, Ca-
ballero and Lyons on European data, and Oulton on UK 
manufacturing data (124 industries over nine sub-periods 
within 1954-1986).14 Hall had invoked a “thick market ex-
ternality” to explain the phenomenon: an example is the 
delivery van which travels as many miles on average in 
good times as in bad times but delivers more packages 
when times are good. This suggests that the effect oper-
ates at business cycle frequencies and is simply due to 
varying utilisation.
But this is not the only possibility. Oulton found that the 
externalities seem to apply peak-to-peak as well as over 
the course of the business cycle, which is not consistent 
with the thick market story.15 Another type of externality 
is a learning effect: knowledge of new techniques and 
methods diffuses faster through the economy as the rate 
of overall expansion increases. This type of effect would 
be expected to operate peak-to-peak.
Did the TFP slowdown precede the Great Recession?
The earlier release of the EU KLEMS dataset (the March 
2011 update of the November 2009 release) provides good 
quality and methodologically consistent data for 18 coun-
tries over varying time periods, ending in 2007. Figure 1 
plots the results. Each panel shows the actual path of TFP 
growth (light green line), the Hodrick-Prescott trend (dark 
green line) and the mean over the sample period for each 
country (dashed line). With t he exceptions of Australia and 
Ireland, there is little evidence of decline. In 2007 most 
countries were at or above their own mean level.
Because of its economic importance, let us consider the 
US in more detail. Figure 1 does indeed show a decline 
in the HP trend starting around 2003, though in 2007 it 
was still above the mean TFP growth level. The same can-
not be said for the annual TFP growth level, which dipped 
below the mean in 2007. Here we can beneﬁ t from the 
more sophisticated analysis of Crafts and Mills.16 They 
13 R.E. H a l l : The Relation between Price and Marginal Cost in U.S. In-
dustry, in: Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 96, No. 5, 1988, pp. 921-
947.
14 See J. B a r t e l s m a n , R.J. C a b a l l e ro , R.K. Ly o n s : Customer- and 
supplier-driven externalities, in: American Economic Review, Vol. 84, 
No. 4, 1994, pp. 1075-1084; R.J. C a b a l l e ro , R.K. Ly o n s : Internal 
versus external economies in European industry, in: European Eco-
nomic Review, Vol. 34, No. 4, 1990, pp. 805-826; and N. O u l t o n : In-
creasing Returns and Externalities in UK Manufacturing: Myth or Re-
ality?, in: Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 44, No. 1, 1996, pp. 99-
113.
15 N. O u l t o n : Increasing Returns… , op. cit.
16 N. C r a f t s , T.C. M i l l s : Predicting Medium-Term TFP Growth in the 
United States: Econometrics vs. ‘Techno-Optimism’, in: National In-
stitute Economic Review, Vol. 242, No. 1, 2017, pp. R60-R67.
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apply a time series model to Fernald’s quarterly series 
for TFP growth in the business sector.17 TFP growth is 
modelled as a random walk (the trend) plus a zero-mean, 
auto-correlated “noise” process. Crafts and Mills ﬁ nd, us-
ing Fernald’s series for the whole period 1947-2015, that 
the trend has been slowing continuously since 1967, from 
around 1.5% pa to around 1.0% pa in 2016. The actual 
TFP measurement according to Fernald’s data over 2007-
2015 was 0.56% pa (0.63% pa adjusted for utilisation). 
In other words, the outturn was substantially lower than 
the trend, as estimated by Crafts and Mills. Another way 
to look at it is to note that the Crafts-Mills trend growth 
rate in 2016 was about 0.1% pa lower than in 2000, so the 
slowdown in trend growth was quite modest in relation to 
what actually occurred.18
17 J.G. F e r n a l d : A Quarterly, Utilization-Adjusted Series on Total Fac-
tor Productivity, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Working Pa-
per No. 2012-19, updated 2014.
18 Ibid. From the spreadsheet accompanying Fernald’s paper, dated 1 
February 2018, it can be calculated that comparing 2007-2015 with 
2000-2007, unadjusted TFP growth slowed down by 0.63 pppa; ad-
justed for utilisation, the slowdown was 0.57 pppa. This is very similar 
to the slowdown of 0.54 pppa in Table 1, which is for the whole econo-
my.
We lack a comparable analysis for the other countries, 
but it seems likely that even less of their slowdown can 
be attributed to a decline in trend growth preceding the 
crisis. The US slowdown was less pronounced than aver-
age, while most of the other countries in Table 1 could still 
beneﬁ t from catching up to the US TFP level. Hence, it is 
implausible to attribute the declining TFP growth in these 
countries to an exogenous decline in innovation.
Exogenous or recession-induced decline: A test of the 
two hypotheses
It is difﬁ cult to test these ideas using the latest release of 
the EU KLEMS dataset since there are only 14 countries 
for which TFP growth rates are available. So I use instead 
the latest release of the Penn World Table database.19 
After eliminating countries with populations of less than 
2 million and those with no data on hours worked, there 
19 As described in R.C. F e e n s t r a , R. I n k l a a r, M.P. T i m m e r : The 
Next Generation of the Penn World Table, in: American Economic Re-
view, Vol. 105, No. 10, 2015, pp. 3150-3182. Version 9.0 is the most 
recent version and is freely available at https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/pro-
ductivity/pwt.
Figure 1
TFP growth in the market sector in 18 countries up till 2007
in % per annum
N o t e : Trend growth rate is that of HP-smoothed TFP level. Dashed lines denote country means of actual TFP growth rate.
S o u rc e s : N. O u l t o n :  The mystery of TFP, in: International Productivity Monitor, Vol. 31, 2016, pp. 68-87, derived using EU KLEMS (the March 2011 up-
date of the November 2009 release).
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remain 52 countries for which TFP is available. Two draw-
backs of the Penn World Table should be noted. First, the 
capital variable is the aggregate capital stock, not the 
superior capital services measure. Second, the terminal 
year is 2014, not 2015.
The externality hypothesis suggests that, for cross-
country comparisons, the bigger the slowdown in GDP, 
the bigger the slowdown in TFP. Table 2 shows the re-
sults of running this test. The coefﬁ cient on GDP is 
highly signiﬁ cant (t = 6.6). Taken literally, this says that 
a slowdown of one percentage point in GDP causes a 
slowdown of 0.53 percentage points in TFP. The correla-
tion between the two variables is 0.72.
But how do we know that causality runs from GDP to 
TFP and not the other way round, as conventional 
growth theory would suggest? Column 2 of Table 2 is 
a test of the Solow model’s predictions about the effect 
of a slowdown in TFP growth, which the model takes to 
be exogenous. That model predicts that a slowdown in 
TFP growth will cause a slowdown in the growth rate of 
capital intensity. But the coefﬁ cient on the latter, 0.28, 
is much smaller than the model predicts: with a capital 
share of about one-third, the coefﬁ cient should be about 
1.5. It is also insigniﬁ cant, and the correlation between 
the two variables is only 0.24. I thus conclude that the 
externality hypothesis ﬁ nds support in the data.
Concluding remarks
The productivity puzzle – continued low rates of growth 
of both labour productivity and of TFP, ten years after 
the end of the previous boom – is largely explained by 
the recession itself. Labour productivity growth has 
varied quite a lot across countries, but I argue that this 
largely reﬂ ects varying labour market institutions.20 In 
countries with ﬂ exible labour markets, wages adjusted 
and employment was maintained. In other words, labour 
productivity took the hit when the growth of GDP was 
constrained by deﬁ cient demand for each country’s ex-
ports. The fall in TFP growth since 2007 is far too large to 
be explained by an exogenous decline in the rate of in-
novation and technical progress. Instead, it is more likely 
to reﬂ ect the damage done by the recession itself. A pro-
cess of increasing returns – now working in the malign, 
reverse direction – has reduced TFP growth. I ﬁ nd that 
countries which suffered the biggest reduction in GDP 
growth after 2007 also suffered the biggest reduction in 
TFP growth.
Even if we tend to side with the technology pessimists, 
there is clearly scope for substantially raising productivi-
ty, particularly in Europe. But if the underlying problem is 
constrained demand for each country’s exports, then it 
is not one which any single country can solve on its own. 
“Ending austerity” in any one country (except perhaps 
the very largest) will not do the trick, since it would just 
lead to a balance of payments problem and increased 
debt. If the analysis here is accepted, then one theoreti-
cal possibility is a coordinated ﬁ scal and/or monetary 
expansion across the Western world, combined perhaps 
with incentives to raise investment. To state it in these 
terms merely emphasises how implausible such a policy 
sounds. But it is possible that a single large country – or 
a bloc of smaller ones – could adopt such policies in an 
uncoordinated way, which might have something of the 
desired effect.
Alternatively, we could just wait for the world economy 
to recover of its own accord. At the time of writing, there 
is much optimism among international organisations 
and commentators about growth prospects in Western 
countries. If these forecasts turn out to be right, then the 
problem may solve itself. But these hopes may turn out 
to be misplaced or exaggerated, as have earlier ones. 
In that case, the need for new policies to address the 
productivity puzzle, beyond the usual call for “structural 
reforms”, will remain on the table.
20 This argument draws on N. O u l t o n : The UK… , op. cit.
Change in TFP 
growth
Change in K/L 
growth
-1 -2
Change in GDP growth 0.527*** —
(0.0803)
Change in TFP growth — 0.283
(0.194)
Constant -0.281 1.105***
(0.168) (0.363)
N 52 52
R-squared 0.514 0.058
Table 2
Change in TFP growth and change in capital intensity 
growth in 52 countries
N o t e : Changes are measured as annual average growth over 2007-2014 
minus annual average growth over 2000-2007. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
S o u rc e : Penn World Table, version 9.0, and own calculations. I use the 
PWT’s “national accounts” variables: rgdpna, rkna and rtfpna for indices 
of real GDP, real capital stock and TFP respectively.
